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A Covert Encryption Method for Applications in
Electronic Data Interchange
Jonathan M Blackledge, Fellow, IET, Fellow, BCS and Dmitry A Dubovitskiy, Member IET
Abstract— A principal weakness of all encryption systems is
that the output data can be ‘seen’ to be encrypted. In other
words, encrypted data provides a ‘flag’ on the potential value
of the information that has been encrypted. In this paper, we
provide a new approach to ‘hiding’ encrypted data in a digital
image.
In conventional (symmetric) encryption, the plaintext is usually
represented as a binary stream and encrypted using an XOR type
operation with a binary cipher. The algorithm used is ideally
designed to: (i) generate a maximum entropy cipher so that
there is no bias with regard to any bit; (ii) maximize diffusion
in terms of key dependency so that a change in any bit of the
key can effect any, and potentially all, bits of the cipher. In the
work reported here, we consider an approach in which a binary
or low-bit plaintext image is encrypted with a decimal integer
or floating point cipher using a convolution operation and the
output quantized into a 1-bit array generating a binary image
ciphertext. This output is then ‘embedded’ in a host image to
hide the encrypted information. Embedding is undertaken either
in the lowest 1-bit layer or multiple 1-bit layers. Decryption
is accomplished by: (i) extracting the binary image from the
host image; (ii) correlating the result with the original cipher.
In principle, any cipher generator can be used for this purpose
and the method has been designed to operate with 24-bit colour
images. The approach has a variety of applications and, in this
paper, we focus on the authentication and self-authentication
of e-documents (letters and certificates, for example) that are
communicated over the Internet and are thereby vulnerable to
attack (e.g. modification, editing, counterfeiting etc.). In addition
to document authentication, the approach considered provides a
way of propagating disinformation and a solution to scenarios
that require ‘plausible deniability’.
Index Terms— Covert encryption, Steganography, Information
hiding, Authentication
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the principal weaknesses of all encryption systems
is that the form of the output data (the ciphertext), if inter-
cepted, alerts the intruder to the fact that the information
being transmitted may have some importance and that it is
therefore worth attacking and attempting to decrypt it. This
aspect of ciphertext transmission can be used to propagate
disinformation, achieved by encrypting information that is
specifically designed to be intercepted and decrypted. In this
case, we assume that the intercept will be attacked, decrypted
and the information retrieved. The ‘key’ to this approach is
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to make sure that the ciphertext is relatively strong (but not
too strong!) and that the information extracted is of good
quality in terms of providing the attacker with ‘intelligence’
that is perceived to be valuable and compatible with their ex-
pectations, i.e. information that reflects the concerns/interests
of the individual(s) and/or organisation(s) that encrypted the
data. This approach provides the interceptor with a ‘honey pot’
designed to maximize their confidence especially when they
have had to put a significant amount of work in to ‘extracting
it’. The trick is to make sure that this process is not too hard
or too easy. ‘Too hard’ will defeat the object of the exercise
as the attacker might give up; ‘too easy’, and the attacker will
suspect a set-up!
In addition to providing an attacker with a honey-pot for the
dissemination of disinformation, it is of significant value if a
method can be found that allows the real information to be
transmitted by embedding it in non-sensitive information after
(or otherwise) it has been encrypted, e.g. camouflaging the ci-
phertext. This is known as Steganography which is concerned
with developing methods of writing hidden messages in such
a way that no one, apart from the intended recipient, knows
of the existence of the message in contrast to cryptography
in which the existence of the message itself is not disguised
but the content is scrambled [1], [2]. Steganography provides a
significant advantage over cryptography alone in that messages
do not attract attention to themselves, to messengers, or to
recipients. No matter how well plaintext is encrypted (i.e.
how unbreakable it is), by default, a ciphertext will arouse
suspicion and may in itself be incriminating, as in some
countries encryption is illegal.
This paper presents a method of ‘hiding’ encrypted informa-
tion in a colour digital image. In principle, any cipher can be
used to do this providing it consists of floating point numbers
that are ideally, uniformly distributed. The scheme allows
for the authentication and self-authentication of documents
such as letters, certificates and other image based data. The
encrypted watermark can be camouflaged to obfuscate its
existence and the applications to which the method can be
applied are numerous. For example, the self-authentication of
e-documents sent as attachments over the internet provides
a unique facility for many legal and financial transactions
that have traditionally relied on paper based documents to
secure authenticity. The method also provides a unique way
of ‘propagating’ disinformation in the form of an encrypted
document which contains hidden information.
In order to introduce the background to the approach re-
ported in this paper and to set it in a wider context, Sections II
and III provide an overview of Steganography and some of the
management issues associated with data security technology.
This material is designed to place the principle of ‘covert
encryption’ in the category of applications for which it is
designed.
II. STEGANOGRAPHY
The word ‘Steganography’ is of Greek origin and means
‘covered’, or ‘hidden writing’. In general, a steganographic
message appears as something else known as a covertext. By
way of a simple illustrative example, suppose we want to
transmit the phrase
The Queen likes horses
which is encrypted to produce the cipher stream
syoahfsuyTebhsiaulemNG
This is clearly a scrambled version of a message with no
apparent meaning to the order of the letters from which it
is composed. Thus, it is typical of an intercept that might be
attacked because of the very nature of its incomprehensibility.
However, suppose that the cipher stream above could be re-
cast to produce the phrase
Beware of Greeks bearing gifts
If this phrase is intercepted it may not be immediately obvious
that there is alternative information associated with such an
apparently innocuous message, i.e. if intercepted, it is not clear
whether or not it is worth initiating an attack.
The conversion of a ciphertext to another plaintext form
is called Stegotext conversion and is based on the use of
Covertext. Some covertext must first be invented and the
ciphertext mapped on to it in some way to produce the
stegotext. This can involve the use of any attribute that is
readily available such as letter size, spacing, typeface, or other
characteristics of a covertext, manipulated in such a way as to
carry a hidden message. The basic principle is given below:
Data → Covertext
↓
Plaintext → Ciphertext → Stegotext
↓
Transmission
Note that this approach does not necessarily require the use of
plaintext to ciphertext conversion as illustrated above and that
plaintext can be converted into stegotext directly. A simple
approach to this is to use a mask to delete all characters in a
message except those that are to be read by the recipient of
the message. For example, consider the following message:
At what time should I confirm our
activities? kindly acknowledge.
This seemingly innocent plaintext could be used to hide the
message
Attack now
through application of the following mask:
1100001000000000000000000000000000
1100000000001000001000111000000
where 0 denotes that a character or space is to be ignored and
1 denotes that a character or space is used. Apart from estab-
lishing a method of exchanging the mask which is equivalent
to the key in cryptography, the principal problem with this
approach is that different messages have to be continuously
‘invented’ in order to accommodate hidden messages and that
these ‘inventions’ must appear to be legitimate statements.
However, the wealth of data that is generated and transmitted
in todays environment and the wide variety of formats that are
used means that there is much greater potential for exploiting
steganographic methods than were available before the ‘IT
revolution’. In other words, the IT revolution has generated
a camouflage rich environment in which to operate and one
can attempt to hide plaintext or ciphertext (or both) in a host
of data types, including audio and video files and digital
images. Moreover, by understanding the characteristics of a
transmission environment, it is possible to conceive techniques
in which information can be embedded in the transmission
noise, i.e. where natural transmission noise is the covertext.
There are some counter measures - steganalysis - that can
be implemented in order to detect stegotext. However the
technique usually requires access to the covertext which is
then compared with the stegotext to see if any modifications
have been introduced. The problem is to find ways of obtaining
the original covertext.
A. Hiding Data in Images
The relatively large amount of data contained in digi-
tal images makes them a useful ‘medium’ for undertaking
steganography. Consequently digital images can be used to
hide messages in other images. A colour image typically has
8 bits to represent the Red, Green and Blue components. Each
colour component is composed of 256 ‘colour values’ (for a
24-bit image) and the modification of some of these values
in order to hide other data is undetectable by the human
eye. This modification is often undertaken by changing the
least significant bit in the binary representation of a colour or
grey level value (for grey level digital images). For example,
for 7-bit ASCII conversion, the grey level value 100 has
the binary representation 1100100 which is equivalent to the
character d. If we change the least significant bit to give
1100101 (which corresponds to a grey level value of 101 and
character e) then the difference in the output image will not
be discernable even though we have replaced the letter e with
default character d. In this way, the least significant bit can
be used to encode information other than pixel intensity and
the larger the host image compared with the hidden message,
the more difficult it is to detect the message. In this way it is
possible to hide an image in another image for which there are
a number of approaches available (including the application
of bit modification). For example, Figure 1 shows the effect
of hiding one image in another through the process of re-
quantization and addition. The image to be embedded is re-
quantized to just 3-bits or 8 grey levels so that it consists of
an array of integer values between 0 to 7. The result is then
added to the host image (an array of values between 0 and
255) on a pixel by pixel basis such that if the output exceeds
255 then it is truncated (i.e. set to 255). The resulting output
is slightly brighter with minor distortions in some regions of
the image that are homogeneous.
Fig. 1. Illustration of ‘hiding’ one image (top left) in another image (top right)
through simple re-quantization and addition (bottom left). By subtracting the
bottom left image from the top right image and re-quantizing the output, the
bottom right reconstruction is obtained.
Clearly, knowledge of the original host image allows the
hidden image to be recovered (by subtraction) giving a result
that is effectively completely black. However, by increasing
its brightness, the hidden image can be recovered as shown
in Figure 1 which, in this example, has been achieved by re-
quantizing the data from 0-7 back to 0-255 grey levels. The
fidelity of this reconstruction is poor compared to the original
image but it still conveys the basic information, information
that could be covertly transmitted through the host image as
an email attachment, for example. Note that the host image
represents, quite literally, the key to recovering the hidden
image. The additive process that has been applied is equivalent
to the ‘process of confusion’ that is the basis for a substitution
cipher. Rather than the key being used to generate a random
number stream using a pre-defined algorithm from which the
stream can be re-generated (for the same key), the digital
image is, in effect, being used as the cipher. Note that the
distortion generated by re-quantization means that the same
method can not be used if the hidden image is encrypted. The
degradation in the ciphertext will not allow an accurate decrypt
to be accomplished due to loss of data.
Steganography is often used for digital watermarking. This
is where the plaintext, which acts as a simple identifier
containing information such as ownership, copyright and so
on, is hidden in an image so that its source can be tracked or
verified. This is equivalent to hiding a 1-bit image in a host
image as illustrated in Figure 2 which uses the same method
as discussed above. In this example, a columnar transposition
cipher [3], [4] has been used to encrypt this sentence using the
keyword: Steganography - see Appendix I. The grid is given
by
11 12 03 04 01 07 08 05 10 02 09 06 13
I n t h i s e x a m p
l e , a c o l u m n a
r t r a n s p o s i t i
o n c i p h e r h a s
b e e n u s e d t o
e n c r y p t t h i s
s e n t a n c e u s i n
g t h e k e y w o r d
: S t e g a n o g r a p
h y
and the ciphertext is
haai yaeexus huwg ,t ecnts
t rcnrtht opee eenmntaosira
i npupn gscshstckaamihtisor
elordt yoIlrobesg:hne nene
ypais ndp
Note that the host image is required to recover the ciphertext
information and is thus the ‘key’ to this (steganographic)
process.
The methods discussed above refer to electronic-to-
electronic type communications in which there is no loss of
information (assuming the image is not compressed to JPEG
- Joint Photographics Expert Group - format, for example).
Steganography and watermarking techniques can be devel-
oped for hardcopy data which have a range of applications.
However, these techniques have to be robust to the significant
distortions generated by the printing and scanning processes.
A simple approach is to add information to a printed page
that is difficult to see. For example, some modern colour laser
printers, including those manufactured by HP and Xerox, print
tiny yellow dots which are added to each page. The dots are
barely visible and contain encoded printer serial numbers, date
and time stamps. This facility provides a useful forensics tool
for tracking the origins of a printed document.
Fig. 2. Binary image of encrypted information (right), obtained by subtraction
of the covertext image from the stegotext image (left).
B. Hiding Data in Noise
The art of steganography is to use what ever covertext is
readily available to make the detection of plaintext or, ideally,
the ciphertext as difficult as possible. This means that the em-
bedding method used to introduce the plaintext/cipherext into
the covertext should produce a stegotext that is indistinguish-
able from the covertext in terms of its statistical characteristics
and/or the information it conveys. From an information theo-
retic point of view, this means that the covertext should have
significantly more capacity than the cipheretext, i.e. there must
be a high level of redundancy. Utilising noisy environments
often provides an effective solution to this problem. There are
three approaches that can be considered:
• embedding the ciphertext in real noise;
• transforming the ciphertext into noise that is then added
to data;
• replacing real noise with ciphertext that has been trans-
formed in to synthetic noise with exactly the same
properties as the real noise.
In the first case we can make use of noise sources such
as thermal noise, flicker noise, and shot noise associated with
electronics that digitize an analogue signal. In digital imaging
this may be noise from the imaging charge couple device
(CCD) element; for digital audio, it may be noise associated
with the recording techniques used or amplification equipment.
Natural noise generated in electronic equipment usually pro-
vides enough variation in the captured digital information that
it can be exploited as a noise source to ‘cover’ hidden data.
Because such noise is usually a linear combination of different
noise types generated by different physical mechanisms, it is
usually characterised by a normal or Gaussian distribution as
a result of the Central Limit Theorem.
In the second case, the ciphertext is transformed into noise
whose properties are consistent with the noise that is to be
expected in certain data fields. For example, lossy compres-
sion schemes (such as JPEG) always introduce some error
(numerical error) into the decompressed data and this can
be exploited for steganographic purposes. By taking a clean
image and adding ciphertext noise to it, information can be
transmitted covertly providing all users of the image assume
that it is the output of a JPEG or some other lossy compressor.
Of course, if such an image is JPEG compressed, then the
covert information may be badly corrupted.
In the third case, we are required to analyse real noise and
derive an algorithm for its synthesis. Here, the noise has to be
carefully synthesized because it may be readily observable as
it represents the data stream in its entirety rather than data that
is ‘cloaked’ in natural noise. This technique also requires that
the reconstruction/decryption method is robust in the presence
of real noise that is assumed will be added to the synthesized
noise during a transmission phase. In this case, random fractal
models are of value because the spectral properties of many
noise types found in nature signify fractal properties to a
good approximation [5]. This includes transmission noise over
a range of radio and microwave spectra, for example, and
Internet traffic noise.
With regard to Internet traffic noise the time series data
representing packet size and inter-arrival times shows well
defined random fractal properties [6]. There are a range of
time-series models that can be used to characterise Internet
traffic noise based on the number of packets (or bytes) as
a function of time. Fractal time-series models are applicable
when the underlying processes have a similar appearance
regardless of the time scale over which they are observed.
An example of the random fractal nature of Internet traffic
is given in Figure 3 which shows the number of packets per
unit time over four different time scales. Compared with a
time-series model based on Poisson statistics (i.e. a Poisson
random number generator) as shown in Figure 3, it is clear
that Internet traffic noise has fractal characteristics (i.e. has
self-affine behaviour). Like real traffic, Internet traffic changes
over a daily cycle according to the number of users. However,
much of the traffic ‘riding’ the Internet can be modelled using
fractals and as the Internet has become larger and larger,
the fractal nature of the traffic has become more and more
pronounced.
Fig. 3. Simulated Poisson based time-series model (left), real Internet traffic
time-series (centre) and simulated fractal time-series model taken over four
different time scales (from top to bottom respectively). The shaded areas
highlight the data displayed in the plot above, respectively.
C. Disinformation
Disinformation is used to tempt the enemy into believing
certain kinds of information. The information may not be true
or contain aspects that are designed to cause the enemy to
react in an identifiable way that provides a strategic advantage
[7], [8]. Camouflage, for example, is a simple example of
disinformation [9]. This includes techniques for transforming
encrypted data into forms that resemble the environments
through which an encrypted message is to be sent. At a
more sophisticated level, disinformation can include encrypted
messages that are created with the sole purpose of being
broken in order to reveal information that the enemy will react
to by design.
Disinformation includes arranging events and processes
that are designed to protect against an enemy acquiring
knowledge of a successful encryption technology and/or a
successful attack strategy. A historically significant example
of this involved the Battle of Crete which began on the
morning of 20 May 1941 when Nazi Germany launched an
airborne invasion of Crete under the code-name Unternehmen
Merkur (operation mercury) [10]. During the next day, through
miscommunication and the failure of Allied commanders to
grasp the situation, the Maleme airfield in western Crete
fell to the Germans which enabled them to fly in heavy
reinforcements and overwhelm the Allied forces. This battle
was unique in two respects: (i) it was the first airborne invasion
in history1; (ii) it was the first time the Allies made significant
use of their ability to read Enigma codes. The British had
known for some weeks prior to the invasion of Crete that an
invasion was likely because of the work being undertaken at
Bletchley Park. They faced a problem because of this. If Crete
was reinforced in order to repel the invasion then Germany
would suspect that their encrypted communications were being
compromised. But this would also be the case if the British
and other Allied troops stationed on Crete were evacuated.
The decision was therefore taken by Churchill to let the
German invasion proceed with success but not without giving
the invaders a ‘bloody nose’. Indeed, in light of the heavy
casualties suffered by the parachutists, Hitler forbade further
airborne operations and Crete was dubbed ‘the graveyard of
the German parachutists’. The graveyard for German, British,
Greek and Allied soldiers alike was not a product of a fight
over desirable and strategically important territory (at least for
the British). It was a product of the need to secure Churchill’s
‘Ultra-secret’. In other words, the Allied efforts to repulse
the German invasion of Crete were, in reality, a form of
disinformation, designed to secure a secret that was, in the
bigger picture, more important than the estimated 16,800 dead
and wounded that the battle cost.
D. Plausible Deniability
Deniable encryption allows an encrypted message to be
decrypted in such a way that different and plausible plaintexts
can be obtained using different keys [11]. The idea is to make
it impossible for an attacker to prove the existence of the real
message, a message that requires a specific key. This approach
provides the user with a solution to the ‘gun to the head
problem’ as it allows the sender to have plausible deniability
if compelled to give up the encryption key. There are a range
of different methods that can be designed to implement such
a scheme. For example, a single ciphertext can be generated
that is composed of randomised segments or blocks of data
which correlate to blocks of different plaintexts encrypted
using different keys. A further key is then required to assemble
the appropriate blocks in order to generate the desired decrypt.
This approach, however, leads to ciphertext files that are
significantly larger than the plaintexts they contain. On the
other hand, a ciphertext file should not necessarily be the
same size as the plaintext file and padding out the plaintext
before encryption can be used to increase the Entropy of the
ciphertext.
Other methods used for deniable encryption involve estab-
lishing a number of abstract ‘layers’ that are decrypted to yield
different plaintexts for different keys. Some of these layers are
designed to include so-called ‘chaff layers’. These are layers
that are composed of random data which provide the owner of
the data to have plausible deniability of the existence of layers
containing the real ciphertext data. The user can store ‘decoy
files’ on one or more layers while denying the existence of
others, identifying the existence of chaff layers as required.
The layers are based on file systems that are typically stored
1Illustrating the potential of paratroopers and so initiating the Allied
development of their own airborne divisions.
in a single directory consisting of files with filenames that
are either randomized (in the case where they belong to chaff
layers), or are based on strings that identify cryptographic data,
the timestamps of all files being randomized throughout.
E. Steganographic Encryption and Disinformation
It is arguable that disinformation should, where possible,
be used in conjunction with the exchange of encrypted in-
formation which has been camouflaged using steganographic
techniques for hiding the ciphertext. For example, suppose that
it had been assumed by Germany that the Enigma ciphers were
being compromised by the British during the Second World
War. Clearly, it would have been strategically advantageous
for Germany to propagate disinformation using Enigma. If, in
addition, ‘real information’ had been encrypted differently and
the ciphertexts camouflaged using broadcasts through the Ger-
man home radio service, for example, then the outcome of the
war could have been very different. The use of new encryption
methods coupled with camouflage and disinformation, all of
which are dynamic processes, provides a model that, while not
always of practical value, is strategically comprehensive and
has only rarely been fully realised.
III. CRYPTANALYSIS AND THE MANAGEMENT OF
ENCRYPTION TECHNOLOGY
There are numerous historical examples where cryptanalysis
has been used to decrypt encrypted messages. Any crypto-
graphic system must be able to withstand cryptanalysis [12].
Cryptanalysis methods depend critically on the encryption
techniques which have been developed and are therefore sub-
ject to delays in publication. Cryptanalysts work on ‘attacks’ to
try and break a cryptosystem. In many cases, the cryptanalysts
are aware of the algorithm used and will attempt to break the
algorithm in order to compromise the keys or gain access to the
actual plaintext. It is worth noting that even though a number
of algorithms are freely published, this does not mean that
they are the most secure.
Most government institutions and the military do not reveal
the type of algorithm used in the design of a cryptosystem.
The rationale for this is that, if it is difficult to break a code
with knowledge of the algorithm then how difficult is it to
break a code if the algorithm is unknown? On the other hand,
within the academic community, security in terms of algorithm
secrecy is not considered to be of high merit and publication
of the algorithm(s) is always recommended. It remains to
be understood whether this is a misconception within the
academic world (due in part to the innocence associated with
academic culture) or a covertly induced government policy (by
those who are less innocent!).
The ‘known algorithm’ approach originally comes from the
work of Auguste Kerchhoff. Kerchhoff’s Principle states that:
A cryptosystem should be secure even if everything about the
system, except the key, is public knowledge. This principle
was reformulated by Claude Shannon as the enemy knows
the system and is widely embraced by cryptographers world
wide. In accordance with the Kerchhoff-Shannon principle,
the majority of civilian cryptosystems make use of publicly
known algorithms. The principle is that of ‘security through
transparency’ in which open-source software is considered to
be inherently more secure than closed source software. On
this basis there are several methods by which a system can be
attacked where, in each case, it is assumed that the cryptanalyst
has full knowledge of the algorithm(s) used.
A. Example Attack Strategies
Some of principal attack strategies associated with crypt-
analysis are as follows:
1) Ciphertext-only Attack: Cipher-only attacks are where
the cryptanalyst has a ciphertext of several messages at their
disposal. All messages are assumed to have been encrypted
using the same algorithm. The challenge for the cryptanalyst
is to try and recover the plaintext from these messages. Clearly
a cryptanalyst will be in a valuable position if they can recover
the actual keys used for encryption.
2) Known-plaintext Attack: Known-plaintext Attack makes
the task of the cryptanalysis simpler because, in this case,
access is available to both the plaintext and the corresponding
ciphertext. It is then necessary to deduce the key used for
encrypting the messages, or design an algorithm to decrypt
any new messages encrypted with the same key.
3) Chosen-plaintext Attack: Chosen plaitext attacks assume
that the cryptanalyst possesses both the plaintext and the
ciphertext. In addition, the analyst has the ability to encrypt
plaintext and see the ciphertext produced. This provides a
powerful tool from which the keys can be deduced.
4) Adaptive-chosen-plaintext Attack: Adaptive-chosen-
plaintext Attack is an improved version of the chosen-plaintext
attack. In this version, the cryptanalyst has the ability to
modify the results based on the previous encryption. This
version allows the cryptanalyst to choose a smaller block for
encryption.
5) Chosen-ciphertext Attack: Chosen-ciphertext Attack can
be applied when the cryptanalyst has access to several de-
crypted texts. In addition, the cryptanalyst is able to use the
text and pass it though a ‘black box’ for an attempted decrypt.
The cryptanalyst has to guess the keys in order to use this
method which is performed on an iterative basis (for different
keys), until a decrypt is obtained.
6) Chosen-key Attack: Based on some knowledge on the
relationship between different keys and is not of practical
significance except in special circumstances.
7) Rubber-hose Cryptanalysis: The so called rubber-hose
cryptanalysis is based on the use of human factors such as
blackmail and physical threat for example. It is often a very
powerful attack and sometimes very effective.
8) Differential Cryptanalysis: Differential cryptanalysis is
a more general form of cryptanalysis. It is the study of how
differences in an input can affect differences in the output.
This method of attack is usually based on a chosen plaintext,
meaning that the attacker must be able to obtain encrypted
ciphertexts for some set of plaintexts of their own choosing.
This typically involves acquiring a Crib of some type as
discussed in the following section.
9) Linear Cryptanalysis: A known plaintext attack which
uses linear relations between inputs and outputs of an en-
cryption algorithm which holds with a certain probability.
This approximation can be used to assign probabilities to the
possible keys and locate the one that is most probable.
B. Cribs
The problem with any form of plaintext attack is, of course,
how to obtain part or all of the plaintext in the first place. One
method that can be used is to obtain a Crib. A Crib, a term that
originated at Bletchley Park during the Second World War, is
a plaintext which is known or suspected of being part of a
ciphertext. If it is possible to compare part of the ciphertext
that is known to correspond with the plaintext then, with the
encryption algorithm known, one can attempt to identify which
key has been used to generate the cipherext as a whole and thus
decrypt an entire message. But how is it possible to obtain any
plaintext on the assumption that all plaintexts are encrypted in
their entirety? One way is to analyse whether or not there is
any bad practice being undertaken by the user, e.g. sending
stereotyped (encrypted) messages. Analysing any repetitive
features that can be expected is another way of obtaining a
Crib. For example, suppose that a user was writing letters using
Microsoft word, for example, having established an electronic
letter template with his/her name, address, company reference
number etc. Suppose we assume that each time a new letter
is written, the entire document is encrypted using a known
algorithm. If it is possible to obtain the letter template then a
Crib has been found. Assuming that the user is not prepared
to share the electronic template (which would be a strange
thing to ask for), a simple way of obtaining the Crib could
be to write to the user in hardcopy and ask that the response
from the same user is of the same type, pleading ignorance
of all forms of ICT or some other excuse. This is typical of
methods that are designed to seed a response that includes a
useful Crib. Further, there are a number of passive Cribs with
regard to letter writing that can be assumed, the use of Dear
and Yours sincerely, for example.
During the Second World War, when passive Cribs such as
daily weather reports became rare through improvements in the
protocols associated with the use of Enigma and/or operators
who took their work seriously, Bletchley Park would ask the
Royal Air Force to create some ‘trouble’ that was of little
military value. This included seeding a particular area in the
North Sea with mines, dropping some bombs on the French
coast or, for a more rapid response, asking fighter pilots to go
over to France and ‘shoot up’ targets of opportunity, processes
that came to be known as ‘gardening’. The Enigma encrypted
ciphertexts that were used to report the ‘trouble’ could then
be assumed to contain information such as the name of the
area where the mines had been dropped and/or the harbour(s)
threatened by the mines. It is worth noting that the ability to
obtain Cribs by gardening was made relatively easy because
of the war in which ‘trouble’ was to be expected and to
be reported. Coupled with the efficiency of the German war
machine with regard to its emphasis on accurate and timely
reports, the British were in a privileged position in which they
could create Cribs at will and have some fun doing it.
When a captured and interrogated German stated that
Enigma operators had been instructed to encode numbers by
spelling them out, Alan Turing reviewed decrypted messages,
and determined that the number ‘eins’ appeared in 90% of
the messages. He automated the Crib process, creating an
‘Eins Catalogue’, which assumed that ‘eins’ was encoded at
all positions in the plaintext. The catalogue included every
possible position of the various rotors and plug board settings
of the Enigma. This provided a very simple and effective
way of recovering the key and is a good example of how the
statistics (of a word or phrase) can be used in cryptanalysis.
The use of Enigma by the German naval forces (in par-
ticular, the U-boat fleet) was, compared to the German army
and air force, made secure by using a password from one
day to the next. This was based on a code book provided
to the operator prior to departure from base. No transmission
of the daily passwords was required, passive Cribs were rare
and seeding activities were difficult to arrange. Thus, if not
for a lucky break, in which one of these code books (which
were printed in ink that disappeared if they were dropped in
seawater) was recovered in tact by a British destroyer (HMS
Bulldog) from a damaged U-boat (U-110) on May 9, 1941,
breaking the Enigma naval transmissions under their time-
variant code-book protocol would have been very difficult. A
British Naval message dated May 10, 1941 reads: ‘1. Capture
of U Boat 110 is to be referred to as operation Primrose;
2. Operation Primrose is to be treated with greatest secrecy
and as few people allowed to know as possible...’ Clearly,
and for obvious reasons, the British were anxious to make
sure that the Germans did not find out that U-110 and its
codebooks had been captured and all the sailors who took part
in the operation were sworn to secrecy. On HMS Bulldog’s
arrival back in Britain a representative from Bletchley Park,
photographed every page of every book. The ‘interesting piece
of equipment’ turned out to be an Enigma machine, and the
books contained the Enigma codes being used by the German
navy.
The U-boat losses that increased significantly through the
decryption of U-boat Enigma ciphers led Admiral Carl Doenitz
to suspect that his communications protocol had been com-
promised. He had no firm evidence, just a ‘gut feeling’ that
something was wrong. His mistake was not to do anything
about it, an attitude that was typical of the German High
Command who were certifiable with regard to their confidence
in the Enigma system. However, they were not uniquely cer-
tifiable. For example, on April 18, 1943, Admiral Yamamoto
(the victor of Pearl Harbour) was killed when his plane was
shot down while he was attempting to visit his forces in the
Solomon Islands. Notification of his visit from Rabaul to the
Solomon’s was broadcast as Morse coded ciphertext over the
radio, information that was being routinely decrypted by the
Americans. At this point in the Pacific War, the Japanese
were using a code book protocol similar to that used by the
German Navy, in which the keys were changed on a daily
basis, keys that the Americans had ‘generated’ copies of. Some
weeks before his visit, Yamamoto had been given the option
of ordering a new set of code books to be issued. He had
refused to give the order on the grounds that the logistics
associated with transferring new code books over Japanese
held territory was incompatible with the time scale of his visit
and the possible breach of security that could arise through a
new code book being delivered into the hands of the enemy.
This decision cost him his life. However, it is a decision
that reflects the problems associated with the distribution of
keys for symmetric cryptosystems especially when a multi-
user protocol needs to be established for execution over a wide
communications area. In light of this problem, Yamamoto’s
decision was entirely rational but, nevertheless, a decision
based on the assumption that the cryptosystem had not already
been compromised.
The principles associated with cryptanalysis that have been
briefly introduced here illustrate the importance of using a
dynamic approach to cryptology. Any feature of a security
infrastructure that has any degree of consistency is vulnerable
to attack. This can include plaintexts that have routine phrases
such as those used in letters, the key(s) used to encrypt the
plaintext and the algorithm(s) used for encryption.
C. Management of Encryption Technologies
If there can be such a thing as a ‘golden rule’ associated with
the management of encryption technologies, then it is: never
underestimate the enemy! This includes appreciating that a
clever invention or tactic or both could have been anticipated
by the opponent or have been developed and implemented
a priori. Good security management processes are based on
products, procedures and protocols that are dynamic at least
for the management of systems designed to secure data. How-
ever, for the ‘code breakers’, dynamic systems are notoriously
difficult to attack and information security is therefore best
undertaken by changing the characteristics of the ‘game’. This
approach needs to be realized within the context that ‘gaming’
is valid at many scales, from the socio-political arena to the
level of technical innovation and theoretical detail.
Some of the most innovative ideas in information security
with regard to changing the ‘game’ are the simplest. For ex-
ample, after the Second World War, as the cold war developed,
although the USSR did not have complete knowledge of the
code breaking activities of the other allies (the British and
Americans, in particular), it was well known that the code
breaking activities had been based on information retrieved
by intercepting wireless-based communications (i.e. wireless
encrypted Morse code). For the USSR the answer was simple.
They used land lines until they felt confident of their own
wireless-based cryptosystems. This was not an elegant solution
but it was simple and highly effective and kept NATO ‘in the
dark’ for decades to come with many attempts being made by
the western powers to physically intercept or tap the USSR
‘land-lines’ with little if any success.
It is an irony that as society becomes more and more
‘open and transparent’ with regard to information in general,
including information on how to construct and break industry
standard encryption technology [13], so it becomes increas-
ingly difficult to implement secure policies for the protection
of that society. This is due, not only to the increased technical
awareness, knowledge and abilities of the younger generations,
but is also a product of the social engineering implemented
after the Second World War where deference to authority has
slowly but surely ebbed away. This has led to radical changes
in social- and geo-politics world wide.
The public development of information security technology
is one of the most interesting challenges for state control
over the ‘information society’. As more and more members
of the younger generation become increasingly IT literate, it
is inevitable that a larger body of perfectly able minds will
become aware of the fact that cryptology is not as difficult as
they have been led to believe. As with information itself, the
days when cryptology was in the hands of a select few with
impressive academic credentials and/or luxury civil service
careers are over and cryptosystems can now be developed by
those with a diverse portfolio of backgrounds which does not
necessarily include a University education. This is reflected in
the fact that after the Cold War, the UK Ministry of Defense,
for example, developed a strategy for developing products
driven by commercially available systems. This Commercial-
Off-The-Shelf or COTS approach to defence technology has
led directly to the downsizing of the UK scientific Civil
Service which, during the Cold War, was a major source of
scientific and technical innovation.
The average graduate of today can rapidly develop the
ability to write an encryption system which, although relatively
simple, possibly trivial and ill-informed, can, by the very na-
ture of its non-compliance to international standards, provide
surprisingly good security. This can lead to problems with
the control and management of information when increasingly
more individuals, groups, companies, agencies and nation
states decide that they can ‘go it alone’ and do it themselves.
While each home grown encryption system may be relatively
weak, compared to those that have had expert development
over many years, have been well financed and been tested
against the very best of attack strategies, the proliferation
of such systems is itself a source of significant difficulty
for any authority whose role is to monitor communications
traffic in a way that is timely and cost effective. This is
why governments world-wide are constantly attempting to
control the use and exploitation of new encryption methods
in the commercial sector, e.g. the introduction of legislation
concerning the decryption of massages by a company client
through enforcement of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers
(RIP) Act, UK, 2000 [14]. It also explains the importance
of international encryption standards in terms of both public
perception and free market exploitation. Government and other
controlling authorities like to preside over a situation in which
everybody else is confidently reliant for their information
security on products that have been developed by the very
authorities that encourage their use. The reason for this is
based on the fact that modern encryption systems can not
be successfully attacked unless serious errors are made by
the user (induced or otherwise). In other words, the race
between the code makers and the code breakers was won
by the former many years ago. Thus, only by managing the
users of systems and the systems themselves, can encrypted
information be read. The origins of this approach are discussed
in the following section.
D. Perfidious Albion
A historically important example of Perfidious Albion re-
lates to a British approach for managing the users of encryp-
tion systems and the systems themselves after the end of the
Second World War in the late 1940s and 1950s2, an approach
that has come to dominate the management of encryption
systems in most sectors. As the British army advanced into
west Germany, many thousands of Enigma machines were
captured and stock-piled. An issue arose as to what to do with
them. Two options were available: (i) to destroy them; (ii) to
make good use of them. The latter decision was taken. Coupled
with a ‘spin’ on the quality of German war technology, many
Enigma machines were sold on to governments world wide in
order for the British to gather intelligence based at the new
Government Central Headquarters in Cheltenham. However,
the ‘key’ to this deception was to maintain a critical silence on
the work of Cheltenham. This is why the activities of ‘Station
X’ based at Bletchley Park, England, had to remain secrete
for such a significant length of time - nearly thirty years after
‘Stationed X’ was dismantled on Churchill’s orders.
Although encryption technologies have improved radically
since the development of Enigma, the management of these
technologies has not. The broad strategy is to encourage the
use of an encryption standard (including key management)
that is known and preferably designed by the very authorities
whose principal job is to gather intelligence associated with
communications traffic that has been encrypted using the same
encryption standard. While this management strategy might be
described as an example of ‘Perfidious Albion’, especially by
those who have been managed by it, the strategy has become a
central theme in the management of encryption systems world
wide. It is a strategy that can only be fully compromised
through the development of novel encryption methods that do
not conform to a ‘standard’.
IV. STOCHASTIC CONFUSION AND DIFFUSION
In terms of plaintexts, diffusion is concerned with the issue
that, at least on a statistical basis, similar plaintexts should
result in completely different ciphertexts even when encrypted
with the same key. This requires that any element of the
input block influences every element of the output block in
an irregular fashion. In terms of a key, diffusion ensures that
similar keys result in completely different ciphertexts even
when used for encrypting the same block of plaintext. This
requires that any element of the input should influence every
element of the output in an irregular way. This property must
also be valid for the decryption process because otherwise an
intruder may be able to recover parts of the input from an
observed output by a partly correct guess of the key used
for encryption. The diffusion process is a function of the
sensitivity to initial conditions that all cryptographic systems
must have. Further, all cryptographic systems should exhibit
an inherent topological transitivity causing the plaintext to be
mixed through the action of the encryption process.
2Based on comments made by Dr S Singh - http://www.simonsingh.net/ - at
a Keynote Address, ‘The Science of Secrecy’, 20th Irish Signals and Systems
Conference, University College Dublin, June 10th - 11th, 2009.
The process of ‘confusion’ ensures that the (statistical)
properties of plaintext blocks are not reflected in the cor-
responding ciphertext blocks. Every ciphertext must have
a random appearance to any observer and be quantifiable
through appropriate statistical tests. Diffusion and confusion
are processes that are of fundamental importance in the
design and analysis of cryptological systems, not only for the
encryption of plaintexts but for data transformation in general.
A. Stochastic Confusion
The simplest approach to encrypting plaintext described by
the vector p (e.g. consisting of 7-bit ASCII decimal integers) is
to add a cipher denoted by n which is taken to be a stochastic
function consisting of random numbers, i.e. n is a vector
consisting of noise. The ciphertext c is then given by
c = p+ n (1)
This is an example of a substitution cipher and relies on the
use of ciphers that can be regenerated by a ‘key’ which is the
initial condition used to ‘drive’ a random number generated
whose algorithm is known. For a 7-bit ASCII code, if the value
of any element of the array c exceeds 127 then the result is
wrapped (e.g. 121+10=3), the output being taken to be the
modulo of 127. In practice, this process is usually carried out
in ‘binary space’ by first converting the arrays p and c to
binary form pb and cb, respectively. The binary ciphertext cb
is then computed using the XOR operation, i.e.
cb = nb ⊕ pb
The plaintext is given by
pb = nb ⊕ cb
Irrespective of whether this simplest of encryption schemes
is implemented in decimal integer or binary space, it is im-
perative that the cipher exhibits statistical properties such that
there is no bias associated with the frequency of occurrence
of any element. In other words the histrogam of n must be
uniformly distributed in order to counteract a statistical attack
based on analysing the frequency of occurrence of elements of
p in which the space between each word is the most common.
Equivalently, in binary space, it is important that there is no
bias towards a 0 or 1 so that the number of bits should be
the same in any binary cipher. The additive process associated
with equation (1) represents a process of confusion based on,
what is in effect, the addition of uniformly distributed noise. It
is an example of stochastic confusion upon which the majority
of both substitution and transposition (or both) ciphers are
based. The aim is to generate a maximum entropy cipher in
such a way that there is maximum possible diffusion in terms
of key dependency (i.e. that a change in any single bit of
the key can effect any, and potentially, all bits of the cipher).
This is the usual concept in which the term diffusion is used in
cryptology, the aim being to maximize (in terms of the entropy
of the ciphertext) the process of both diffusion and confusion.
B. Stochastic Diffusion
In this paper we consider the diffusion of plaintext in terms
of the convolution of a plaintext array with the cipher, the
ciphertext being given by
c[i] = n[i]⊗ p[i] =
∑
j
n[j − i]p[j]
where ⊗ denotes the convolution sum as defined above.
It is well known that for x ∈ (−∞,∞), the solution to the
diffusion equation
(D∂2x − ∂t)c(x, t) = 0, c(x, 0) = p(x)
where D is the Diffusivity and p(x) is the initial condition, is
given by [16]
c(x, t) = g(x, t)⊗x p(x) =
∞∫
−∞
g(y − x, t)p(y)dy
where ⊗x now represents the convolution integral (over inde-
pendent variable x) as defined above and
g(x, t) =
√
1
4piDt
exp
(
− x
2
4Dt
)
Here, the diffusion of p(x) is determined by a convolution with
a Gaussian function whose standard deviation is determined
by the product of the Diffusivity D and the time t over which
the diffusion process occurs. Stochastic diffusion is based on
replacing the convolution kernel (i.e. the function g) for a
stochastic function n so that
c(x, t) = n(x, t)⊗x p(x)
For any time t, the ciphertext is given by the convolution of
the plaintext with the cipher. In this sense, any fixed value of
time ti, i = 1, 2, 3... can be taken to represent the initial value
used to generate n(x), i.e. the key used to initiate the random
number generating algorithm.
The inverse problem associated with stochastic diffusion as
defined above is not as simple as applying an XOR operation
to the ciphertext in binary space. In this case we are required
to apply a suitable deconvolution process, i.e. to solve the
problem: Given c and n, compute p. We can deconvolve by
using the convolution theorem giving
p(x) = F−11
[
C(k)N∗(k)
| N(k) |2
]
where N is the Fourier transform of n, C is the Fourier
transform of c, k is the spatial frequency and F−11 denotes
the (one-dimensional) inverse Fourier transform, i.e. for a
piecewise continuous function f(x) with spectrum denoted by
F (k),
F−11 [F (k)] =
1
2pi
∞∫
−∞
F (k) exp(ikx)dx = f(x)
and
F (k) =
∞∫
−∞
f(x) exp(−ikx)dx
This approach requires regularization in order to eliminate
any singularities when | N |2→ 0 through application of a
constrained deconvolution filter [17], [18]. It is not appropriate
for encryption because the inverse process is fundamentally ill-
conditioned. Instead we consider a method which allows the
inverse problem to be solved directly by correlation. To do
this the cipher needs to be ‘pre-conditioned’. We let
m(x) = F−11 [M(k)]
where ∀k
M(k) =
{
N∗(k)
|N(k)|2 , | N(k) |6= 0;
N∗(k), | N(k) |= 0.
The ciphertext is then given by
c(x) = m(x)⊗x p(x)
This result allows us to solve the inverse problem by correlat-
ing (denoted by x) c with n. This is based on the following
analysis: Using the convolution theorem
m(x)⊗x p(x)↔M(k)P (k)
and, using the correlation theorem,
n(x)x c(x)↔ N∗(k)C(k)
where ↔ denotes transformation into Fourier space. Thus
N∗(k)C(k) = N∗(k)M(k)P (k) = N∗(k)
N∗(k)
| N(k) |2 = P (k)
so that
p(x) = n(x)x c(x)
The pre-conditioning of a cipher so that decryption can be
undertaken using correlation provides a simple solution for
utilizing the process of stochastic diffusion to encrypt data. In
this paper, the process is applied in ‘image space’ to watermark
a digital image.
V. DIGITAL IMAGE WATERMARKING
In ‘image space’, we consider the plaintext to be an image
p(x, y) of compact support x ∈ [−X,X]; y ∈ [−Y, Y ].
Stochastic diffusion is then based on the following results:
Encryption
c(x, y) = m(x, y)⊗x ⊗yp(x, y)
where
m(x, y) = F−12 [M(kx, ky)]
and ∀kx, ky
M(kx, ky) =
{
N∗(kx,ky)
|N(kx,ky)|2 , | N(kx, ky) |6= 0;
N∗(kx, ky), | N(kx, ky) |= 0.
Decryption
p(x, y) = n(x, y)x yc(x, y)
Here, kx and ky are the spatial frequencies and F−12 denotes
the two-dimensional inverse Fourier transform. For digital
image watermarking, we consider a discrete array pij , i =
1, 2, ..., I; j = 1, 2, ..., J of size I × J and discrete versions
of the operators involved, i.e. application of a discrete Fourier
transform and discrete convolution and correlation sums.
For a host image denoted by h(x, y), we consider a water-
marking method based on the equation
c(x, y) = Rm(x, y)⊗x ⊗yp(x, y) + h(x, y)
where
‖m(x, y)⊗x ⊗yp(x, y)‖∞ = 1
and
‖h(x, y)‖∞ = 1
By normalising the terms in this way, the coefficient 0 ≤ R ≤
1 can be used to adjust the relative magnitudes of the terms
such that the diffused image m(x, y) ⊗x ⊗yp(x, y) becomes
a perturbation of the ‘host image’ (covertext) h(x, y). This
provides us with a way of digital watermarking [19] one image
with another, R being referred to as the ‘watermarking ratio’,
a term that is equivalent, in this application, to the standard
term ‘Signal-to-Noise’ or SNR as used in signal and image
analysis. For colour images, the method can be applied by
decomposing the image into its constituent Red, Green and
Blue components. Stochastic diffusion is then applied to each
component separately and the result combined to produce an
colour composite image.
For applications in image watermarking, stochastic diffusion
has two principal advantages:
• a stochastic field provides uniform diffusion;
• stochastic fields can be computed using random number
generators that depend on a single initial value or seed
(i.e. a private key).
A. Binary Image Watermarks
Watermarking a full grey level or colour image with another
grey or colour image, respectively, using stochastic diffusion
leads to two problems: (i) it can yield a degradation in the
quality of the reconstruction especially when R is set to a
low value which is required when the host image has regions
that are homogeneous; (ii) the host image can be corrupted by
the watermark leading to distortions that are visually apparent.
Points (i) and (ii) lead to an optimisation problem with regard
to the fidelity of the watermark and host images in respect of
the value of the watermark ratio that can be applied limiting
the type of host images that can be used and the fidelity of
the ‘decrypts’. However, if we consider the plaintext image
p(x, y) to be of binary form, then the output of stochastic
diffusion can be binarized to give a binary ciphertext. The
rationale for imposing this condition is based on considering a
system in which a user is interested in covertly communicating
documents such as confidential letters and certificates, for
example.
If we consider a plaintext image p(x, y) which is a binary
array, then stochastic diffusion using a pre-conditioned cipher
0 ≤ m(x, y) ≤ 1 consisting of an array of floating point
numbers will generate a floating point output. The Shannon
Information Entropy of any array A(xi, yi) with Probability
Mass Function (PMF) p(zi) is given by
I = −
∑
i=1
p(zi) log2 p(zi)
The information entropy of a binary plaintext image (with
PMF consisting of two components whose sum is 1) is
therefore significantly less than the information entropy of
the ciphertext image. In other words, for a binary plaintext
and a non-binary cipher, the ciphertext is data redundant. This
provides us with the opportunity of binarizing the ciphertext by
applying a threshold T , i.e. if cb(x, y) is the binary ciphertext,
then
cb(x, y) =
{
1, c(x, y) > T
0, c(x, y) ≤ T (2)
where 0 ≤ c(x, y) ≤ 1∀x, y. A digital binary ciphertext image
cb(xi, yj) where
cb(xi, yi) =
{
1, or
0, for any xi, yj
can then be used to watermark an 8-bit host image h(x, y), h ∈
[0, 255] by replacing the lowest 1-bit layer with cb(xi, xj).
To recover this information, the 1-bit layer is extracted from
the image and the result correlated with the digital cipher
n(xi, yj). Note that the original floating point cipher n is
required to recover the plaintext image and that the binary
watermark can not therefore be attacked on an exhaustive
XOR basis using trial binary ciphers. Thus, binarization of
a stochastically diffused data field is entirely irreversible, i.e.
equation (2) describes a one-way function.
B. Statistical Analysis
The expected statistical distribution associated with stochas-
tic diffusion is Gaussian. This can be shown if we consider
a binary plaintext image pb(x, y) to be described by a sum
of N delta functions where each delta function describes the
location of a non-zero bit at coordinates (xi, yj). Thus if
pb(x, y) =
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
δ(x− xi)δ(y − yj)
then
c(x, y) = m(x, y)⊗x ⊗yp(x, y)
=
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
m(x− xi, y − yj).
Each function m(x − xi, y − yj) is just m(x, y) shifted by
xi, yj and will thus be identically distributed. Hence, from the
Central Limit Theorem
Pr[c(x, y)] = Pr
 N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
m(x− xi, y − yj)
 =
N∏
i=1
⊗ Pr[m(x, y)] ≡ Pr[m(x, y)]⊗x ⊗yPr[m(x, y)]⊗x ⊗y...
∼ Gaussian(z), N →∞
where Pr denotes the Probability Density Function. We can
thus expect Pr[c(x, y)] to be normally distributed and for
m(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]∀x, y the mode of the distribution will be
of the order of 0.5. This result provides a value for the
threshold T in equation (2) which for 0 ≤ c(x, y) ≤ 1 is 0.5
(theoretically). Note that if n(x, y) is uniformly distributed and
thereby represents δ-uncorrelated noise then both the complex
spectrum N∗ and power spectrum | N |2 will also be δ-
uncorrelated and since
m(x, y) = F−12
[
N∗(kx, ky)
| N(kx, ky) |2
]
Pr[m(x, y)] will be uniformly distributed. Also note that the
application of a threshold which is given by the mode of the
Gaussian distribution, guarantees that there is no statistical
bias associated with any bit in the binary output, at least,
on a theoretical basis. On a practical basis, this needs to be
computed directly by calculating the mode from the histogram
of the cipher and that bit equalization can not be guaranteed
as it will depend on: (i) the size of the images used; (ii) the
number of bins used to compute the histogram.
C. Principal Algorithms
The principal algorithms associated with the application of
stochastic diffusion discussed so far are as follows:
Algorithm I: Encryption and Watermarking Algorithm
Step 1: Read the binary plaintext image from a file and
compute the size I × J of the image.
Step 2: Compute a cipher of size I × J using a private key
and pre-condition the result.
Step 3: Convolve the binary planitext image with the pre-
conditioned cipher and normalise the output.
Step 4: Binarize the output obtained in Step 3 using a
threshold based on computing the mode of the Gaussian
distributed ciphertext.
Step 5: Insert the binary output obtained in Step 4 into the
lowest 1-bit layer of the host image and write the result to a
file.
The following points should be noted:
(i) The host image is taken to be an 8-bit or higher grey
level image which should be of the same size as the plaintext
image or else resized accordingly. However, in resizing the
host image, its proportions should be the same so that the
stegotext image does not appear to be a distorted version of
the covertext image. For this purpose, a library of host images
should be developed whose dimensions are set according to
a predetermined application where the size of the expected
plaintext images are known.
(ii) Pre-conditioning the cipher and the convolution processes
are undertaken using a Discrete Fourier Transform (DFT).
(iii) The output given in Step 3 will include negative floating
point numbers upon taking the real component of a complex
array. The array must be rectified by adding the largest
negative value in the output array to the same array before
normalisation.
(iv) For colour host images, the binary ciphertext can be
inserted in to one or all of the RGB components. Ths provides
the facility for watermarking the host image with three binary
ciphertexts (obtained from three separate binary documents,
for example) into a full colour image. In each case, a different
key can be used.
(v) The binary plaintext image should have homogeneous
margins in order to minimise the effects of ringing due to
‘edge-effects’ when processing the data in the spectral domain.
Algorithm II: Decryption Algorithm
Step 1: Read the watermarked image from a file and extract
the lowest 1-bit layer from the image.
Step 2: Regenerate the (non-preconditioned) cipher using the
same key used in Algorithm I.
Step 3: Correlate the cipher with the input obtained in Step 1
and normalise the result.
Step 4: Quantize and format the output from Step 3 and write
to a file.
The following points should be noted:
(i) The correlation operation should be undertaken using a
DFT.
(ii) For colour images, the data is decomposed into each RGB
component and each 1-bit layer is extracted and correlated
with the appropriate cipher, i.e. the same cipher or three
ciphers relating to three private keys respectively.
(iii) The output obtained in Step 3 has a low dynamic range
and therefore requires to be quantized into an 8-bit image
based on floating point numbers within the range max(array)-
min(array).
D. Examples Results
An example of stochastic diffusion is given in Figure 4
which shows the diffusion of a binary plaintext image with a
uniformly distributed cipher and binarization. Figure 5 shows
the histograms associated with each image given in Figure 4
illustrating a realization of the statistical analysis discussed
in Section V(B). In particular, we see that the diffusion pro-
cess generates a Gaussian distributed ciphertext whose mode
defines the threshold used to generate the binary ciphertext.
Figure 6 shows the decrypts before and after binarization of
the ciphertext. In the latter case, an accurate representation
of the plaintext is obtained albeit embedded in noise. In this
case, the fidelity of the decrypt can be improved further by
applying a threshold to binarize the result after application of
a Gaussian lowpass filter to reduce the level of the background
noise. Post-processes of this type can be used to enhance the
fidelity of the decrypt as required using a range of image
processing methods in order to improve the readability of
the image. The type of post-processes applied depends on
whether or not the decrypt is used for other applications such
as optical character recognition. Figure 7 shows the result of
Fig. 4. Illustration of stochastic diffusion using 8-bit grey level images:
Binary plaintext image (top-left); uniformly distributed cipher (top-right);
grey-level ciphertext after application of stochastic diffusion (bottom-left);
binary ciphertext after application of a 50% threshold (bottom-right).
Fig. 5. 64-bin histograms associated with the images given in Figure 4.
applying Algorithm I and Algorithm II for a full colour 24-
bit image. This example illustrates the embedding of a binary
ciphertext into the lowest 1-bit level of a host image which
provides a facility to ‘hide’ information in an image without
impeding the fidelity of the host image. In this example, the
binary cipher has been inserted into each RGB component.
This improves the fidelity of the decrypt which becomes the
result of contributions from all three colour channels rather
than one channel in the case of a grey level image.
Fig. 6. Decrypts using the grey-level ciphertext (left) and the ciphertext after
binarization (right)
Fig. 7. Example of stochastic diffusion applied to a 24-bit colour image (top-
left) used to hide an encrypted image of a plaintext image with different font
sizes (top-right). The fidelity of the decrypt (bottom-left) is enhanced through
the use of a colour host image and watermarking all three colour components
with the same watermark. The result can then be post-processed to generate
a high quality reconstruction of the original plaintext (bottom-right) which in
this case has been generated using a Gaussian lowpass filter with a radius of
1 pixel followed by binarization using a user defined threshold adjusted to
give a visually optimal result.
E. 2-bit Randomization
A principal weakness in the algorithms proposed is that the
binary watermark is inserted into the lowest 1-bit layer of the
host image. The ciphertext can therefore easily be removed
and cryptanalysed. A simple solution to this problem is to
randomize the watermark over the lowest 2-bit layers of the
host image. Thus if cb(xi, xj) is the binary watermark of size
X × Y and 0 ≤ r(xi, yj) ≤ 1 is an array of uniformly
distributed floating point numbers (also of size X × Y ) we
apply the quantization
∀xi, yj ∈ [X × Y ]
R(xi, yj) =

0, 0 ≤ r(xi, yj) < 0.333;
1, 0.333 ≤ r(xi, yj) < 0.666;
2, 0.666 ≤ r(xi, yj) < 1;
The watermark is then 2-bit randomized by simple array
addition to give
C(xi, xj) = cb(xi, xj) +R(xi, yj)
The 2-bit array C then replaces the lowest 2-bit layer of
the host image. The 1-bit watermark is recovered using array
subtraction, i.e.
cb(xi, xj) = C(xi, xj)−R(xi, yj)
which requires that r can be reproduced using a cipher
generating algorithm with a known ‘key’ as discussed in
Section VII.
VI. STEGOCRYPT
StegoCrypt is a prototype software system engineered using
MATLAB to examine the applications to which stochastic
diffusion can be used as compounded in Algorithm I and
Algorithm II. It has been designed with a simple Graphical
User Interface as shown in Figure 8 whose use is summarised
in the following table:
Encryption Mode Decryption Mode
Inputs: Inputs:
Plaintext image Stegotext image
Covertext image Private key (PIN)
Private Key (PIN)
Output: Output:
Watermarked Covertext image Decrypted watermark
Operation: Operation:
Encrypt by clicking on Decrypt by clicking on
button E (for Encrypt) button D (for Dycrypt)
The PIN (Personal Identity Number) can be an numerical
Fig. 8. Graphical User Interface for StegoCrypt.
string with upto 16 elements. A demo version of StegoCrypt
is available from
http://eleceng.dit.ie/arg/downloads/StegoCrypt.zip.
Installation is initiated through setup.exe from the root folder
in which the downloaded application has been placed (after
unzipping the downloaded file StegoCrypt.zip) and following
the instructions on screen.
VII. CIPHER GENERATION
The security of a cryptographic system depends on the
generation of unpredictable random numbers [24] [25], even
though it is difficult to generate a truly random number
generator using software-based algorithms [26]. Good random
number generators enhance the strength of cryptography and
many different methods of generating random numbers have
been developed for this purpose. An interesting and relatively
simple method is called the diceware passphrase [27]. In this
method, a list of words is generated and each word numbered.
The numbers are generated from an dice, which acts as a
random number generator, and are assembled as a five digit
number, e.g. 43146. This number is then used to look up
a word in a word list. A major advantage of the Diceware
approach is that the level of unpredictability in the passphrase
can be easily calculated. Each diceware word adds 12.9 bits of
information entropy to the passphrase, i.e. log2(65) bits where
five words (slightly over 64 bits) are considered a minimum
length.
The best random numbers are created by harnessing natural
physical processes, such as radioactive decay, which is known
to exhibit truly random behaviour [28]. Emissions may be
detected in rapid succession or with relatively long delays
between emissions, delays that are unpredictable and random.
An emission detector cycles through the alphabet at a fixed rate
and outputs a letter when an emission is detected. The cycle
then continues until the next emission is detected providing
another randomly selected letter and so on, a process that
generates genuinely random numbers. For example, HotBit
[29] random numbers are generated using a radiation source
involving beta decay. A user contacts the server, where upon
the output can be downloaded over the web. The random num-
bers provided by HotBits (http://www.fourmilab.ch/hotbits/)
are ideal for stream ciphers. However, because they are not
generated by some key dependent encryption algorithm, the
entire random number stream needs to be exchanged between
sender and receiver rather than the key itself. To do this, the
random number stream is itself encrypted.
Linear Congruential Generators (LCGs) are based on an
iteration of the type
xi+1 = (a1xmi + a2x
m−1
i + a3x
m−2
i + ...am+1)modP
where P is a prime number, typically a large Mersenne prime
number Mn = 2n − 1 where n is chosen for primality such
that if Mn is a prime number, then so is n. The coefficients aj
are chosen to produce a uniformly distributed random number
stream for initial condition x[1]. However, cipher generators
of this type are vulnerable to attack and cannot be used in
cryptography as they are predictable and any LCG can be
broken [30].
For cryptographically secure applications there are a range
of cipher generating algorithms that can be implemented which
is the theme of this section. Any cipher must be capable of
ideally generating a uniformly distributed array of integer dec-
imal or floating point numbers which are then normalised to
be in the range 0 to 1 inclusively. However, the ideal statistical
output of a cipher is sometimes of secondary importance to the
characteristics of the algorithm itself in terms of a complexity
theoretic approach and the ciphers discussed in this section
are examples of complexity theoretic ciphers.
Each cipher is taken to be determined by some function
such that
xi+1 = function(xi)
where x1 is the ‘key’ whose statistical ‘performance’ (i.e. mea-
sure of randomness) depends on a single or set of parameters.
For the application discussed here, a two dimensional array
nij ≡ n[i][j], i = 1, 2, ..., I; j = 1, 2, ..., J is generated using
the following pseudo coded (no standard) algorithm:
// Set initial value, e.g. the key
// or Personal Identity Number > 0.
x[1]=PIN;
// where PIN is a numerical string.
// Compute a two-dimensional array
// y[i][j] of size IxJ composed of
// elements of array x[k].
k=2;
for j=1 to J DO:
for i=1 to I DO:
x[k]=FUNCTION(x[k-1]);
y[i][j]=x[k];
k=k+1;
END DO
END DO
// where FUNCTION is taken to output
// x[i]>=0 forall i.
// Normalise the array.
for j=1 to J DO:
for i=1 to I DO:
n[i][j]=y[i][i]/MAX(y[i][j]);
END DO
END DO
// where the function MAX computes
// the maximum array value.
A cryptographically secure cipher is required to be utilised
for Step 2 of Algorithm I prior to pre-conditioning the data.
The following functions are examples of ‘stream’ cipher
functions available for this purpose.
A. Additive Generator [23]
function(xi) = (xi−a + xi−b + ...+ xi−m)mod2e
where a, b, ...,m and e are assigned integers. The algorithm
commences by initialising an array xi with random numbers
(obtained from a LCG, for example, for a known key) so
that we can consider the initial state of the generator to be
x1, x2, x3, ... Additive generators create very long cycles of
random numbers.
B. Blum-Blum-Shub Cipher [31]
function(xi) = x2imod(pq)
where p and q are two large prime numbers (whose product
forms the so called Blum integer) that both have a remainder of
3 when divided by 4, i.e. p = q = 3mod4 which is equivalent
to
pmod4 = qmod4 = 3
The initial value x1 that initiates the generator is given by
x1 = x2mod(pq)
where x is the key which is a relatively prime of pq. The
security associated with this function lies in the difficulty of
factoring pq and the nonlinear nature of the iteration which
makes it effectively impossible to predict the output of the
generator unless the exact value of x0 - the ‘key’ - is known.
This is a cyptographically secure pseudorandom bit generator.
It is not possible to design a polynomial-time algorithm that,
on input of the first k bits of an output sequence, can predict
the (k + 1)th bit with a probability significantly greater than
0.5. In other words, given the first k bits of the sequence, there
is not a practical algorithm that can even allow us to state
that the next bit will be 1 (or 0) with a probability greater
than 0.5. This function is unpredictable to the left and to the
right meaning that for a given sequence, a cryptanalyst cannot
predict the next or previous bit in the sequence. This cipher
has a non-iterative form given by
xi = x
2imod[(p−1)(q−1)]
0 mod(pq)
and is one of the simplest and most efficient complexity-
theoretic cipher generators of it type.
C. Blum-Micali Cipher [32]
function(xi) = pximod(q)
where p is a prime and q is an odd prime. This function gets its
security from the difficulty of computing discrete logarithms.
In order for this generator to be secure, the prime number p
needs to be large enough so that computing discrete logarithms
modp is infeasible.
D. RSA Cipher [33]
function(xi) = xeimod(pq)
where p and q are two large primes and e is an integer which
is relatively prime to (p − 1)(q − 1) and the key x1 is less
than pq.
E. Matthews Cipher [34]
function(xi) = (1 + r)
(
1 +
1
r
)r
xi(1− xi)r,
∀ r ∈ (0, 4]
The Matthews cipher is a chaotic cipher based on a mod-
ification of the logistic map x ← rx(1 − x), r ∈ (1, 4]. The
effect of this generalization is to produce chaotic behaviour
over a greater ‘parameter space’ r. Compared to the logistic
map which yields full chaos at r = 4, the chaotic behaviour of
the Matthews map is more extensive providing full chaos for
the majority (but not all) values of r between approximately
0.5 and 4. The key is the value of x1 (the initial condition of
type float or double depending on the precision that is used -
ideally double precision - such that 0 < x1 < 1). In addition,
because there is a wide range of chaotic behaviour for the
Matthews map, the value of r itself can be used as a primary
(or secondary) key.
F. Chaotic Ciphers [36]
One of the problems with chaotic ciphers is that they
tend to have relatively low cycle lengths and the statistical
distribution of the output is not normally uniform. Thus, in
addition to having to use floating point arithmetic (usually with
double precision), statistical partitioning methods need to be
used to output a cipher that is uniformly distributed. Chaotic
ciphers are therefore computationally inefficient. The principle
advantages of using chaotic ciphers are: (i) their non-reliance
on the use of prime numbers which place conditions on the
characteristics and arithmetic associated with an encryption
algorithm (e.g. the Blum-Blum-Shub and RSA algorithms);
(ii) the potentially unlimited number of chaos based algorithms
that can be ‘invented’ to produce a meta-encryption engine,
i.e. a cipher based on the application of multiple functions
for encrypting data on a block-by-block basis. In this case, a
LCG, or other cipher (or even a ‘master’ chaotic cipher) is
used to generate random block lengths Lj to which randomly
selected functions functionRj are applied:
function[x(i)] =

functionR1 [x(i)], i ∈ [1, L1]
functionR2 [x(i)], i ∈ [L1 + 1, L2]
...
...
functionRN [x(i)], i ∈ [LN−1 + 1, LN ]
where LN is the length of the cipher and Rj is a random
integer that ‘points’ to a function in a database containing a
library of upto N functions. This multi-algorithmic approach is
an extension of the ‘M Algorithm’ [37] which is a method for
combining multiple pseudo random streams that increases their
security where one generators output is used to select a delayed
output from another generator. The ciphers required for the
system discussed in Section VI do not require a long cycle
length unless the image is very large and the downloadable
demonstration version of StegoCrypt therefore uses a single
chaotic cipher. The seed is generated from the PIN by placing
a decimal point before the start of the string, i.e. key = .PIN
G. Application of Encryption Standards
In principal, any existing encryption algorithm or encryption
system can be used to generate the cipher required by Ste-
goCrypt by encrypting an image composed of random noise.
The output is then needs to be converted into a decimal integer
array and the result normalised as required, i.e. depending on
the format of the output that is produced by a given system.
In this way, StegoCrypt can be used in conjunction with any
existing encryption standard.
VIII. APPLICATIONS
The principal aim of the approach described in this paper is
to encrypt an image and transform the ciphertext into a binary
array which is then used to watermark a host image. This
provides a general method for hiding encrypted information
in ‘image-space’. In this sense, we have developed a covert
encryption method for Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) and,
in this section, we focus on some specific applications of value
to EDI.
A. Electronic Document Authentication
Electronic or E-documents consisting of letters and certifi-
cates, for example, are routinely used in EDI. EDI refers to
the structured transmission of data between organizations by
electronic means. It is used to transfer electronic documents
from one computer system to another; from one trading
partner to another trading partner, for example [21]. The USA
National Institute of Standards and Technology defines EDI
as the computer-to-computer interchange of strictly format-
ted messages that represent documents other than monetary
instruments [22]. EDI remains the data format used by the
vast majority of electronic transactions in the world and EDI
documents generally contain the same information that would
normally be found in a paper document used for the same
organizational function.
In terms of day-to-day applications, EDI relates to the use
of transferring documents between two parties in terms of an
attachment. For hardcopies, the attachment is typically the
result of scanning the document and generating an image
which is formatted as a JPEG or PDF (Print Device File) file,
for example. This file is then sent as an attachment to an email
which typically refers to the attachment, i.e. the email acts as
a covering memorandum to the information contained in the
attachment. However, a more common approach is to print
a document directly to PDF file, for example. Thus, letters
written in MicroSoft word, for example, can be routinely
printed to a PDF file for which there are a variety of systems
available, e.g. PDF suite http://pdf-format.com/suite/.
For letters and other documents that contain confidential
information, encryption systems are often used to secure the
document before it is attached to an email and sent. The
method discussed in this paper provides a way of encrypting a
document using stochastic diffusion and then hiding the output
in an image, thus providing a covert method of transmitting en-
crypted information. However, the approach can also be used
to authenticate a document by using the original document
as a ‘host image’. In terms of the StegoCrypt GUI shown in
Figure 8, this involves using the same file for the Input and
Host Image. An example of this is shown in Figure 9 where a
hardcopy issue of a certificate has been scanned into electronic
form - to a .bmp image file. The properties of the image are
as follows: File size=3.31Mb; Pixel Dimensions - Width=884
pixels, Height =1312 pixels; Document Size - Width=39.5
cm, Height=46.28cm; Resolution=28 pixels/cm. The result has
been encrypted and binarised using stochastic diffusion and the
output used to watermark the original document. The fidelity
of the decrypt is perfectly adequate to authenticate aspects of
the certificate such as the name and qualifications of the holder,
the date and signatures, for example. Figure 10 shows the
‘Coat of Arms’ and the signatures associated with the decrypt
given in Figure 9. These results illustrate that the decrypt is
adequately resolved for the authentication of the document as
a whole. It also illustrates the ability for the decrypt to retain
the colour of the original plaintext image.
Fig. 9. Certificate with binary watermark (left) and decrypt (right).
Fig. 10. ‘Coat of Arms’ (left) and signatures (right) of decrypt given in
Figure 9.
B. Authentication of Electronic Letters
When a document is scanned, noise is generated and
becomes an inherent feature of the image even though it
may not be visually intrusive, e.g. the image of the scanned
certificate given in Figure 9. Low level scan noise in a digital
image of a scanned document with a uniform (typically white)
background is of value in camouflaging the existence of a
1-bit or randomized 2-bit based watermark. However, when
a digital image of a letter is generated directly, no noise is
generated. This provides a method of revealing the existence,
or otherwise, of the watermark. For example, Figure 11 shows
an example letter generated by ‘printing’ it directly to an image
file format from the MS Word Editor in which it is composed.
If the original image is histogram equalized [35], the white
background of the image is not altered because it is perfectly
homogenous. However, if the watermarked image is histogram
equalized, the existence of the watermark is revealed which
defeats the covertness of the approach.
The solution is to add low level noise to the image before
inserting the watermark so that it is not clear as to whether
the information revealed through histrogram equalization or
through direct statistical inspection of the image is due
to the presence of a watermark or background noise. For
users of MicroSoft word, the solution is to use a texture
(Format→Background→Fill Effect...) to generate an inho-
mogeneous background or to include a Picture Watermark
(Format→Background→Printed Watermark...) with Washout.
Figure 12 shows an example of applying this method to
‘camouflage’ a 1-bit watermark. In this case, addition of a
texture leads to an indeterminacy as to whether analysis of
the lowest 1-bit or 2-bit layer of the image is a watermark,
randomized watermark or otherwise.
One of the weaknesses of watermarking a letter with itself
(a form of self-authentication) is the range of Cribs that are
available to an attacker who has extracted the watermark and
undertaking cryptanalysis. Thus, ideally, features such as the
letter headings and date, for example, should be eliminated
from the host image before encryption is undertaken, leaving
just the text and important features such as the signature, for
example, as agreed by the user(s).
C. Propagation of Disinformation
The technique provides a method of propagating disinfor-
mation. Instead of watermarking a letter with itself in order
to authenticate the information the letter contains, one letter
can be watermarked with a different letter. The host letter is
then designed to provide disinformation on the assumption
that the email to which it has been ‘attached’ is intercepted.
The watermark is taken to contain the genuine information
which could be of an encrypted (alphanumeric) type. In order
to encourage an attack, assessment and possible reaction to
the disinformation, the attachment can be encrypted using a
standard encryption system to a ‘strength’ compatible with
the expectations the intended attacker and recipient of the
disinformation has with regard to the source of the data. In
other words, the strength of the encryption used should reflect
the security interests of the sender as perceived by the attacker.
D. Plausible Deniability
Another reason for encrypting stegotext is to provide a
solution that allows a sender to decrypt the data to provide
plausible information if forced to do so through a Rubber-hose
Cryptanalysis. With regard to this application, it is possible to
develop different encrypted information which is embedded
Fig. 11. Example of a plaintext image of a letter (above) after histogram
equalisation with (bottom) and without (centre) inclusion of a binary water-
mark.
Fig. 12. Example of a plaintext image to which a background texture has
been applied before introducing a 1-bit watermark (above) and the associated
decrypt (below).
into the host image at additional layers. Thus, in addition to
replacing the lowest 1-bit layer of the host image with the
binary ciphertext, the next lowest 1-bit layer is replaced with
another binary ciphertext. If cb,1[i][j] and cb,2[i][j] are two
distinct binary cipheretext images, both consisting of elements
that are either 0 or 1, then the first and second 1-bit layers of
the covertext image are replaced with cb,1[i][j] and 2+cb,2[i][j]
respectively. This process can be repeated for further layers
depending on the characteristics of the host image, i.e. the
redundancy of pixel values in each 1-bit layer with regard to
the fidelity of the stegotext image.
E. Key-Exchange
In order to use StegoCrypt effectively the system must be
designed with: (i) a cryptographically secure cipher generator;
(ii) a key exchange algorithm. Point (i) has already been
discussed in Section VII. With regard to point (ii) there are
a range of key exchange algorithms available that can be
implemented [32]. A common solution is to utilise the RSA
algorithm, not to encrypt plaintext, but to encrypt and transmit
the keys used to drive a symmetric encryption system of which
StegoCrypt is a typical example.
The RSA algorithm is named after Ronald Rivest, Adi
Shamir and Leonard Adelman, Computer Science researchers
at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, who developed
and patented the algorithm in 1977. RSA gets its security
from the difficulty of factoring large numbers [38]. The public
and private keys are functions of a pair of large (100 to 200
digits or even larger) prime numbers. Recovering the plaintext
from the public key and the cipher text is conjectured to be
equivalent to factoring the product of the two primes. The
success of this algorithm, which is one of the oldest and most
popular public key cryptosystems, is based on difficulty of
factoring. For completeness, A brief overview of the RSA
algorithm is given in Appendix II.
IX. DISCUSSION
The use of the internet to transfer documents as image
attachments has and continues to grow rapidly as part of
a global EDI infrastructure. It is for this ‘market’ that the
approach reported in this paper has been developed. Inserting
a binary watermark into a host image obtained by binarizing a
floating point citertext of a document provides a cryptograph-
ically secure solution. Although the watermark can be easily
removed from the covertext image - unless 2-bit randomization
is implemented as discussed in Section V(E) - it can not be
decrypted without the recipient having access to the correct
cryptographically secure algorithm and key. The encrypted
watermark is not ‘suspicious’ especially when a document has
background scan noise, for example, or a background texture
has been introduced as discussed in Section VIII(B).
The key-exchange approach discussed in Section VIII(E) is
typical of an infrastructure based on a single sender-receiver
scenario in which the use of a system such as SegoCrypt is
downloaded and installed by both parties or is accessible on-
line. In this case, the algorithm used to generate the cipher
is the same and the security is based on the PIN which is
exchanged using a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI).
Another approach is to use an open key approach but
provide a version of StegoCrypt that has a unique cipher gener-
ating algorithm designed specifically for the ‘service provider’.
For example, many institutes such as universities still issue
‘paper certificates’ to their graduates. These certificates are
then scanned and sent as attachments along with a CV and
covering letter when applying for a job. It is at this point
that the certificate may be counterfeited and, for this reason,
some establishments still demand originals to be submitted.
StegoCrypt provides the facility to issue electronic certificates
(in addition or in substitution to a hardcopy) which can then
be authenticated as discussed in Section VIII(A). By including
a serial number on each certificate (a Certificate Identity
Number) which represents an ‘open key’, the document can
be submitted to the authority that issued the certificate for
authentication, for which an online service can be established
as required. The security associated with this scenario relies on
the ‘authority’ having and using a unique complexity theoretic
cipher generator. This ‘Private Algorithm Infrastructure’ or
PAI is at odds with Kerchhoff-Shannon principle (i.e. that the
enemy knows the system) but in light of the issues discussed
in Section III(D), provides the opportunity for an authority to
introduce their own ‘private practice’ subject to any regulation
of investigatory powers.
APPENDIX I
TRANSPOSITION CIPHERS
A transposition cipher changes the order in which characters
arise in a plaintext [39], [40]. A bijective function is used on
the characters’ positions to encrypt and an inverse function to
decrypt. A function f from a set X to a set Y is said to be
bijective if for every y in Y there is exactly one x in X such
that y = f(x). In other words, f is bijective if there exists a
one-to-one correspondence between the sets.
A typical approach to designing a transposition cipher is to
use a so called Columnar transposition. Consider the plaintext
THE CAT SAT ON THE MAT
and the keyword
TIGER
which is converted into a numerical array by the alphabetical
order in which the letters occur (i.e. 53214). We consider a
set of columns that depend on the length of the keyword that
is used and write the plaintext into the resulting grid; thus
53214
THE C
AT SA
T ON
THE M
AT
The columns are then written out in the numerical order
associated with the keyword, i.e.
SN E OE HT HTCA M TATTA
If a keyword is chosen that has multiple occurrences of a letter,
then we can consider two approaches:
• the letters are treated as if they are the next letter in
alphabetical order, e.g. the keyword MAXIMUS yields a
numeric keystring of 3172465.
• recurrent keyword letters are numbered identically, e.g.
the keyword MAXIMUS yields the numerical keystring
3162354. This is the basis for the Myszkowski trans-
position cipher in which plaintext columns with unique
keystring numbers are transcribed down each column and
those with recurring numbers are transcribed left to right.
A. Example Transposition Ciphers
1) The Bifid Cipher: Consider the following 5 x 5 Polybius
square with a randomised alphabet
1 2 3 4 5
1 B G W K Z
2 Q P N D S
3 I O A X E
4 F C L U M
5 T H Y V R
which is the ‘key’ to the following encryption processes in
which we consider the plaintext TRANSPOSITION. Coordinate
convention is undertaken where the coordinates are written
below each letter, thus,
T R A N S P O S I T I O N
5 5 3 2 2 2 3 2 3 5 3 3 2
1 5 3 3 5 2 2 5 1 1 1 2 3
and then output on a row by row basis:
55322232353321533522511123
By dividing this integer stream up into coordinate pairs, the
ciphertext can be generated using the same Polybius square
key, i.e.
55 32 22 32 35 33 21 53 35 22 51 11 23
R 0 P O E A Q Y E P T B N
Note that each ciphertext character depends on two plaintext
characters and hence, the Bifid cipher is a digraphic cipher.
To decrypt, the procedure is simply reversed. With regard
to longer messages, block encryption is used. As with all
block encryption techniques, the plaintext is first broken up
into blocks of either fixed or random length. Each block is
then encrypted separately. For random block encryption, an
algorithm/key is used that randomises the length of each block.
2) The Trifid Cipher: The Trifid cipher is based on the
principles of the Bifid cipher but instead of using a two
dimensional grid we consider a three dimensional grid. Three
coordinates are assigned to each letter or symbol to form the
key. Thus, consider a 3× 3× 3 = 27 cube where
A 111 F 112 N 113
I 121 U 122 V 123
G 131 K 132 O 133
L 211 D 212 T 213
Q 221 R 222 J 223
B 231 H 232 Y 233
M 311 S 312 X 313
E 321 P 322 W 323
C 331 Z 332
The plaintext transposition now becomes
T R A N S P O S I T I O N
2 2 1 1 3 3 1 3 1 2 1 1 1
1 2 1 1 1 2 3 1 2 1 2 3 1
3 2 1 3 2 2 3 2 1 3 1 3 3
giving the number stream
221133131211112111231212313213223213133
which, converting into triplets gives the ciphertext
221 133 131 211 112 111 231
Q O G L F A B
212 313 213 223 213 133
D X T J T O
The method can of course be extended to higher dimensions.
Further each dimension can be used to represent one bit in
the binary representation of a symbol. In other words, the
principles associated with using Bifid and Trifid encryption can
be applied in binary form using a scrambled 7-bit ASCII table,
for example, which forms a ‘key’ to the encryption/decryption
process.
B. Anagramming
A single transposition cipher can be attacked by guessing
column lengths, writing the message out in its columns (but in
the wrong order, as the key is not yet known), and then looking
for possible word associations. To increase its strength, the
columnar transposition can be applied twice where the same
key is used in each case or two different keys are used - double
encryption. There are, as usual, a number of variations that can
be applied to this method. Further, a random number generator
can be used to produce the numerical array that controls the
order in which the columns are used, the keyword being used
as the initial condition, for example.
Because transposition does not affect the frequency distri-
bution of a plaintext, statistical analysis is an obvious way for
a cryptanalysis to launch an attack. If the ciphertext exhibits a
frequency distribution very similar to plaintext, it is most likely
the result of transposition or a poorly designed substitution
cipher. Upon concluding that a transposition cipher has been
applied, the ciphertext can be attacked by anagramming.
Anagramming is based on shifting partitioned sections of the
ciphertext and looking for sections that look like anagrams
of English words and then solving the anagrams. Once such
anagrams have been found, they reveal information about
the transposition pattern and can consequently be extended.
Simple transposition ciphers have the property that if a key is
tried that is very close to the correct key, then it can reveal
sections of legible plaintext interspersed by scrambled data.
Consequently such ciphers are vulnerable to optimum seeking
algorithms such as genetic algorithms.
C. Fractionation and Diffusion
The weaknesses associated with both substitution and trans-
position ciphers used separately can be overcome by combin-
ing the two. For example, a ciphertext generated through a
substitution cipher can then be transposed. Anagramming the
transposition cipher is then invalid because of the substitution
process applied a priori. This combination approach is partic-
ularly powerful if combined with fractionation. Fractionation
is one way of generating diffusion in a cipher, which in terms
of plaintexts is designed to ensure that, at least on a statistical
basis, similar plaintexts do not result in similar ciphertexts
even when encrypted using the same key.
Fractionation is a pre-process in which each plaintext
symbol is divided into a number of ciphertext symbols. For
example, if the plaintext alphabet is written out in a grid, then
every letter in the plaintext can be replaced by its grid co-
ordinates. This is the rationale associated with the use of the
Polybius square
1 2 3 4 5
1 A B C D E
2 F G H I J
3 K L M N O
4 P Q R S T
5 U V W X Y
where the word CHESS can be represented by the ‘coordi-
nates’ number stream 1323154444. Originally conceived by
Polybius in Ancient Greece as a method for telegraphy, in
cryptography, the square (which can be of any size in order
to accommodate alphabets and characters sets of different
lengths) can be used to fractionate.
Another method of fractionation is to simply convert the
message to a code (such as Morse code or an equivalent), with
a symbol for spaces as well as dots and dashes. When fraction-
ated plaintexts are transposed, the components of individual
letters become widely separated in the message. This achieves
a greater level of diffusion, i.e. the diffusivity increases. Note
that the transposition process can be implemented by replacing
each component of the plaintext with a binary representation
using the ASCII code which is also used to convert the new
binary string into the corresponding ASCII characters. This
process can be iterated in binary form to further strengthen
the ciphertext. The disadvantage of combination ciphers, frac-
tionation and further variations on a theme is that they are
usually computationally intensive and error prone compared to
simpler ciphers. Such ciphers are of historical interest, when
computational methods for generating random and/or chaotic
numbers was not possible, and many modern encryption
techniques are substitution based in which the computational
effort is focused on producing cryptographically secure ciphers
- pseudo random or pseudo chaotic number streams.
APPENDIX II
RSA ALGORITHM
The basic generator, as presented Section VII(D), can be
used to compute a cipher. However, the real value of the
algorithm lies in its use for transforming plaintext Pi to
ciphertext Ci directly via the equation
Ci = P ei mod(pq), e < pq
We then consider the decryption process to be based on the
same type of transform, i.e.
Pi = Cdi mod(pq)
The problem is then to find d given e, p and q. The ‘key’ to
solving this problem is to note that if ed − 1 is divisible by
(p− 1)(q − 1), i.e. d is given by the solution of
de = mod[(p− 1)(q − 1)]
then
Cdi mod(pq) = P
ed
i mod(pq) = Pimod(pq)
using Fermat’s Little Theorem, i.e. for any integer a and prime
number p
ap = amodp
Note that this result is strictly dependent on the fact that ed−1
is divisible by (p − 1)(q − 1) making e a relative prime of
(p− 1)(q − 1) so that e and (p− 1)(q − 1) have no common
factors except for 1. This algorithm, is the basis for many
public/private or asymmetric encryption methods. Here, the
public key is given by the number e and the product pq which
are unique to a given recipient and in the public domain (like
an individuals telephone number). This public key is then used
to encrypt a message transformed into a decimal integer array
Mi say using the one-way function
Ci =Mei mod(pq).
The recipient is then able to decrypt the ciphetext Ci with
knowledge of p and q which represents the private key
obtained by solving the equation
de = mod[(p− 1)(q − 1)]
for d and then using the result
Mi = Cdi mod(pq).
In this way, the sender and receiver do not have to exchange
a key before encryption/decryption can take place and such
systems, in effect solve the key exchange problem associated
with symmetric ciphers. Note that the prime numbers p and
q and the number e < pq must be distributed to users in
such a way that they are unique to each user on the condition
that d exists! This requires an appropriate infrastructure to
be established by a trusted third party whos ‘business is to
distribute values of e, pq and d to its clients a Public Key
Infrastructure (PKI). A PKI is required in order to distribute
public keys, i.e. different but appropriate values of e and pq for
use in public key cryptography (RSA algorithm). This requires
the establishment of appropriate authorities and directory
services for the generation, management and certification of
public keys.
The principal vulnerability of the RSA algorithm with
regard to an attack is that e and pq are known and that p and
q must be prime numbers - elements of a large but (assumed)
known set. To attack the cipher, d must be found. But it is
known that d is the solution of
de = mod[(p− 1)(q − 1)]
which is only solvable if e < pq is a relative prime of (p −
1)(q − 1). An attack can therefore be launched by searching
through prime numbers whose magnitudes are consistent with
the product pq (which provides a search domain) until the
relative prime condition is established for factors p and q.
However, factoring pq to calculate d given e is not trivial.
Using typical computing power, factoring pq given e is rel-
atively intractable. It is possible to attack RSA by guessing the
value of (p−1)(p−1) but this attack is no easier than factoring
pq which is the most obvious means of attack. Any adversary
will have the public key, e, pq and to find the decryption key d,
the attacker has to factor pq. It is possible for a cryptanalyst
to try every possible d but this brute force approach is less
efficient than trying to factor pq. The application of dedicating
computing facilities for this purpose can also be applied to
compute large values of primes. For this reason, the increase
in computing power will not necessarily provide a solution
for breaking RSA encrypted data. Further, any conceivable
method invented for a cryptanalyst to deduce d may also
provide a new way to factor large numbers which can, in turn,
be used to develop new RSA based encryption. Thus, all that
RSA cryptanalysis has shown is that the attacks discovered
to date illustrate the pitfalls to be avoided when implementing
RSA and although RSA ciphers can be attacked, the algorithm
can still be considered secure when used properly. RSA based
products are available commercially from a range of providers,
e.g. http://www.rsa.com/.
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